Entitled to be Heard: Improving Evidence-Based Policy Making Through Audience and Public Reason by Rhee, Will
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 85 | Issue 4 Article 7
Fall 2010
Entitled to be Heard: Improving Evidence-Based
Policy Making Through Audience and Public
Reason
Will Rhee
West Virginia University College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Education Law Commons
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Law
School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rhee, Will (2010) "Entitled to be Heard: Improving Evidence-Based Policy Making Through Audience and Public Reason," Indiana
Law Journal: Vol. 85: Iss. 4, Article 7.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol85/iss4/7
Entitled To Be Heard:
Improving Evidence-Based Policy Making
Through Audience and Public Reason
WILL RHEE °
"On this important and vital matter of education, I think the children should be
entitled to be heard. "
-Justice William 0. Douglas dissenting in Wisconsin v. Yoder'
"[H]ow is it possiblefor there to exist over time a just and stable society offree and
equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical,
and moral doctrines?"
-John Rawls, Political Liberalism
2
"The task offormulating an acceptable definition of the idea of 'empirical science'is
not without its difficulties. Some of these arise from the fact that there must be many
theoretical systems with a logical structure very similar to the one which at any
particular time is the accepted system of empirical science. This situation is sometimes
described by saying that there are a great many-presumably an infinite number-of
'logically possible worlds'. Yet the system called 'empirical science' is intended to
represent only one world. the 'real world' or the 'world of our experience' ."
-Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery3
INTRODUCTION
My initial reaction to Deirdre Bowen's important empirical study of
underrepresented minority students at colleges and universities with and without
affirmative action policies 4 was emotional. Before my skeptical, habitually critical side
automatically started trying to vet the validity or methodology of the study itself, my
initial reaction was one of empathy with and self-reflection in response to the study's
* Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law. The author
thanks Shelley Cavalieri, Michelle Chang, drd cummings, Chuck DiSalvo, Atiba Ellis, Anne
Lofaso, Jena Martin Amerson, Michael Risch, Bertha Romine, Matt Titolo, Val Vojdik, and
Adriane Williams for their invaluable comments and Daniel Funk for his excellent research
assistance. In addition, the author thanks the West Virginia University College of Law and the
Bloom Junior Faculty Summer Research Grant for support of this Commentary. All errors are
solely the author's.
1. 406 U.S. 205,244 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (rejecting the majority's view
that the religious views of Amish parents determined the question whether the state could place
Amish children under compulsory education past eighth grade).
2. JoHN RAwLS, POLTCAL LIBERALISM 4 (1993).
3. KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DIsCovERY 39 (Karl R. Popper et al. trans.,
Hutchinson & Co. 1959) (1934) (emphasis in original).
4. Deirdre M. Bowen, Brilliant Disguise: An Empirical Analysis of a Social Experiment
Banning Affirmative Action, 85 IND. L.J. 1197 (2010) (explaining the development of
affirmative action).
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implications. What if this study is right? What if minority students who are selected
solely on the basis of their so-called objective merit nevertheless truly face such ironic
and unfair psychic injury at schools that have banned affirmative action?5 What if the
policy of banning affirmative action ironically ends up doing more harm than good to
the very people affirmative action is trying to help?6 Do I have any unacknowledged
biases that might have blinded me from seeing these counterintuitive facts?
I recall feeling a similar emotional reaction five years ago after first reading Richard
Sander's controversial "mismatch thesis" affirmative action empirical study.7 Bowen's
study appears at least in part to be in response to Sander's study.8 Before my critical,
analytical side kicked in, 9 my empathic, self-reflective side had a moment of
dominance. I asked myself what if Sander's study was right? What if affirmative action
policies actually cause black applicants to be mismatched with law schools and thereby
result in more black law students performing poorly academically, dropping out of
school, having trouble finding jobs, and failing the bar examination?' I What if the
policy of affirmative action ironically ends up doing more harm than good to the very
people it is trying to help?" Do I have any unacknowledged biases that might have
blinded me from seeing these counterintuitive facts?
Although Bowen and Sander differ in their respective methodology, 12 areas of
measurement,' 3 and ultimate prescriptive policy recommendations,14 they agree that the
5. See id. at 1199.
6. See id.
7. Richard H. Sander, A Systematic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law
Schools, 57 STAN. L. REv. 367 (2004).
8. See Bowen, supra note 4, at 1200-01 nn.11 & 19.
9. The methodology of Sander's study has been criticized extensively. See andrd douglas
pond cummings, "Open Water": Affirmative Action, Mismatch Theory and Swarming
Predators -A Response to Richard Sander, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 795,799 & n.22, 844-45 (2006)
(collecting criticism). For Sander's earlier reply to such criticism, see Richard H. Sander, A
Reply to Critics, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1963 (2005). For a more recent reply, see Gail Heriot,
Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 17 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 237 (2008).
10. Sander, supra note 7, at 478-80.
11. Id. at 369.
12. Whereas Bowen is a sociologist and her study is a qualitative opinion survey, see
Bowen, supra note 4, at 1214-17, 1245-51 app.A, Sander is an economist and his study is a
quantitative cost-benefit analysis, see Sander, supra note 7, at 367 n.*, 369. Cost-benefit
analysis has been defined "as a strategy for choice in which weightings are allocated to the
available alternatives, arriving at some kind of aggregate figure for each major option." Martha
C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, in COST-
BENEFIT ANALYsIs: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTVES 169,192 (Matthew D.
Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001). Qualitative research has been defined "as a research
strategy that usually emphasizes words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis
of data." ALAN BRYMAN, SOCIAL RESEARCH METHODS 19-20 (2d ed. 2004). Quantitative
research, on the other hand, has been defined "as a research strategy that emphasizes
quantification in the collection and analysis of data." Id. at 19.
13. While Bowen's study examines emotional, psychic, and educational costs and benefits,
Bowen, supra note 4, at 1204-08, Sander's study examines vocationally related cost-benefit
metrics like academic performance and bar passage rates, Sander, supra note 7, at 478-80.
14. While Bowen concludes that affirmative action continues to be an "important tool in the
tool box of equitable education," Bowen, supra note 4, at 1244, Sander concludes that
[Vol. 85:13151316
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target audience15 of policies promoting or banning affirmative action is minority
students.1 6 1 believe that when faced with such empirical evidence about the policies'
target audience, even the most hardened ideologues can experience a similar-and
perhaps fleeting-emotional and empathic moment of self-reflection. As Deborah
Merritt has observed, such empirical studies are "one of the tools we have for
overcoming bias, for showing people that the world is not the way they think it is."
1 7
Is there a way to use this empathic moment to change-as Martin Luther King, Jr.
reportedly said--"a few human hearts"' 8 without sacrificing what is in our "heads"? Is
there a way to use this empathic moment, which may be caused by empirical studies
about the target audience of a policy, to facilitate evidence-based policy making?
I submit that the interplay of Bowen's and Sander's studies suggests something
broader. Perhaps one of the greatest challenges facing pluralistic democracies today is
how to make the best policy decisions amid increasingly irreconcilable ideological
disagreement (what I call ideological conflict) and an overwhelming glut of often
contradictory information of varied quality and objectivity, obtained through a panoply
of different methods (what I call methodological conflict). While most would agree in
principle that policy making should be dictated by the best factual evidence and for the
maximum benefit of the target audience, 9 there is disagreement over how to
implement this principle in practice.
In this Commentary, I present a working idea, the "Audience-Focused Overlapping
Consensus Model," as one attempt to put this principle into practice. How can policy
making be dictated by the best factual evidence and for the maximum benefit of the
target audience? Two possible ways are by requiring (1) the public statement of the
affirmative action "produces more harms than benefits for its putative beneficiaries," Sander,
supra note 7, at 371, 481-82. Given the ideological and methodological differences between
Bowen and Sander's studies, see supra notes 12-13, their different policy prescriptions may not
be surprising.
15. To promote clarity, I will italicize my own terms when they first appear. For a definition
of target audience, see infra text accompanying notes 31-32.
16. See Bowen, supra note 4, at 1197-99, 1208-14 (quoting Justice Thomas's statement
concerning the need to "address the real problems facing 'underrepresented minorities' and
identifying the color-blind ideal's focus upon the alleged ill effects of affirmative action on
minority students); Sander, supra note 7, at 368 (concluding that "the overriding justification for
affirmative action has always been its impact on minorities"). Bowen's study was limited to
undergraduate and graduate minority students, Bowen, supra note 4, at 1215, whereas Sander's
study was limited to black law students, Sander, supra note 7, at 369.
17. Deborah Jones Merritt, The Future ofBakke: Will Social Science Matter?, 59 Oio ST.
L.J. 1055, 1058 (1998); see also Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1489,
1495 n.27 (2005) (stating that empirical studies "rattle us out of a complacency enjoyed after the
demise of de jure discrimination").
18. Jonathon Keats, The Power of the Pulpit: King's Famous Dream Woke up America to
Racial Injustice, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, July 10, 2003, available at http://www.csmonitor.
com/2003/0710/p 15s01-bogn.html. When the executive secretary of the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) publicly boasted about the success of their
litigation efforts, he reportedly remarked to Martin Luther King, Jr., "In fact, Martin, if you have
desegregated anything by your efforts, kindly enlighten me." Id. King allegedly responded,
"Well, I guess about the only thing I've desegregated so far is a few human hearts." Id.
19. The principles underlying this Commentary are also intended to critique policy makers
who rely upon demagoguery, inaccurate or unsupported assumptions, and raw emotion to sway
popular opinion.
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audience of a particular policy and (2) that policy makers scrutinize publicly available
empirical evidence about that audience before making policy decisions. Because it is
impossible to obtain useful factual evidence about the entire world, policy makers
serious about using evidence to guide their decision making out of unavoidable
necessity must place boundaries upon the scope of their information gathering. This
binding public declaration of audience simply provides such boundaries. Moreover, by
publicly stating the target audience of a policy, policy makers in a divisive policy
debate should be able to circumvent both ideological and methodological conflicts and
encourage greater consensus. After summarizing the working model and explaining
some of its potential implications with examples from Bowen's and Sander's studies, I
conclude with directions for future research.
TOWARD AN AUDIENCE-FOCUSED OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS MODEL
My working Audience-Focused Overlapping Consensus20 Model for divisive
debates in a deliberative democracy2 l is composed of five parts and is illustrated in
Figure A.22
During divisive debates-consistent with the duty of civility23 and public reason2 -
each opposing side should: (A) identify clearly and publicly the target and incidental
20. An "overlapping consensus" is John Rawls's answer to the critical question of how to
accommodate "a diversity of conflicting and irreconcilable-and what's more, reasonable-
comprehensive doctrines." RAWLS, supra note 2, at 36. By definition, an overlapping consensus
must be "a freestanding view starting from the fundamental ideas of a democratic society and
presupposing no particular wider doctrine." Id. at 40. An overlapping consensus somehow must
transcend the reasonable yet irreconcilable ideological disagreement among conflicting policies
such that both sides will buy into its fiamework in spite of their severe division. Ideally, it
would be "possible for all to accept" the overlapping consensus "as true or reasonable from the
standpoint of their own comprehensive view, whatever it may be." Id. at 150.
21. This model is informed by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson's theory of
"deliberative democracy," which "affirms the need to justify decisions made by citizens and
their representatives. Both are expected to justify the laws they would impose on one another."
AMY GUTMANN & DENNiS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 3 (2004).
22. Figure A uses three generic opposing viewpoints ("Opposing Viewpoint 1," "Opposing
Viewpoint 2," and "Opposing Viewpoint 3") as examples. Each viewpoint has its own
associated audience, authentic outcomes, individual narratives, benefits, and burdens. Although
none of the sample audiences are coextensive, there is overlap among all three audiences.
23. Adhering to an overlapping consensus, thus, is a "duty of civility" in a constitutional
democracy where citizens are "able to explain to one another on those fundamental questions
how the principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by ... public
reason." RAwLS, supra note 2, at 217.
24. "Public reason.., involves a set of shared considerations which count as good reasons
in public deliberation and argument about laws and their interpretation.... SAMUEL FREEMAN,
JUSTICE AND THE SOCIAL CoNTRACT: ESSAYS ON RAWLSIAN PoLTICAL PHILOSOPHY 219 (2007).
In divisive policy debates, because individual citizens maintain their "non-public, unshared
reasons" for their policy position, "citizens may dissent from the outcome of public reason or
endorse it for non-shared reasons, while still acknowledging it as valid from the public political
perspective." William P. Umphres, In Defense of Overlapping Consensus: Stability, Legitimacy
and Disagreement 16 (Mar. 2008) (unpublished manuscript, presented at Midwest Political
Science Association Annual National Conference, Apr. 3, 2008), available at
1318 [Vol. 85:1315
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audience of its respective policy position; (B) present for public scrutiny (1) authentic
outcomes obtained from empirical studies about the benefits and burdens of the current
policy upon its audience, or (2) individual narratives only in rebuttal to such authentic
outcomes; (C) examine civilly and sincerely the other side's publicly available
authentic outcomes or rebutting individual narratives about the benefits and burdens of
the current policy upon the other side's target and incidental audience; (D) consider
whether the current policy actually affects every side's audience in the manner
envisioned by every side; and (E) adjust the current policy until it can be ascertained
through authentic outcomes or rebutting individual narratives that the policy benefits or
burdens the target audience in such a way that the target audience both knows and
understands the benefits or burdens.
Opposing Policy Viewpoint 1
o Benet urtu
iBurens dividul Reason
r.I arraive
W0
0 "0
C. 0
00
OVERLAPPING
AU&WOAUDIENCE
(Divisive debate over hard' policy choices.)
Figure A: Audience-Focused Overlapping Consensus Model
A. Identify the Audience of Each Policy Position
First, each opposing side should clearly and publicly identify the target and
incidental audience of its respective policy position. This working model is intended
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p267283_index.html. Public reason, therefore, "does not end
political disagreement; it guides it." Id. at 17. "[I]t is possible that different or even
contradictory positions will find support in the public reason of a given society." Id.
13192010]
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for "hard" 25 policy choices in a pluralistic democracy like affirmative action.
Affirmative action remains one of the most divisive ideological issues in America
today.26 As Lloyd Weinreb observed, affirmative action "has produced the most
explicit and persistent concrete conflict about the nature ofjustice in recent American
life."27 On a theoretical level, such conflict may be unavoidable because affirmative
action is "a specification of the abstract contradiction between the ideas of liberty and
equality," and "[t]here is no correct principle of liberty or equality in such a situation;
the effects of principles applied in the past, which are now perceived to be wrong, can
be undone only by the application of principles that also appear to be wrong., 28 Like
theoretical "Blue States" and "Red States,"29 proponents and opponents of affirmative
action just may be divided fundamentally and irreconcilably on first principles.
The working model thereby seeks to answer John Rawls's critical question: "[H]ow
is it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal
citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and
moral doctrines?, 30 The overlapping consensus 31 that the model aspires to attain is
25. GuTmANN & THOMPSON, supra note 21, at 10 (discussing the importance of decisions
based on merit, rather than party power, in a deliberative democracy).
26. andrd douglas pond cummings, Grutter v. Bollinger, Clarence Thomas, Affirmative
Action and the Treachery of Originalism: "The Sun Don't Shine Here in This Part of Town, "
21 HARv. BLACKLETrER L.J. 1, 2-7, nn.5 & 19 (2005) (collecting media stories about the
divisiveness of the affirmative action debate). As John H. Bunzel, former president of San Jose
State University, observed:
[T]he debate over affirmative action was already being cast in a familiar idiom: If
you are not actively with us, you are actively against us. However, I could not
accept the simplistic choice of "friend" vs. "enemy," especially when applied to a
college or university. The issue for me was not simply "doing the right thing" but
of competing and legitimate values and their relationship to many practical
problems. It was my contention that affirmative action involved (and still involves)
a collision of rights and principles.
JOHN H. BUNZEL, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION: A DILEMMA OF CONFLICTING
PRINCIPLES 2 (1998).
27. LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 232 (1987).
28. Id. at 232-33.
29. See Barack Obama, I11. State Sen., Keynote Address at the Democratic National
Convention (July 27, 2004) ("The pundits like to slice-and-dice our country into Red States and
Blue States; Red States for Republicans, Blue States for Democrats.").
30. RAwLs, supra note 2, at 4. Before attempting to answer that critical question, I want to
clarify what Rawls declines to do. All of Rawls's theories are ideal. Based upon his famous
"original position" and "veil of ignorance," Rawls assumes a utopian ideal society where
everyone is reasonable and willingly complies with just, enlightened laws. Chantal Mouffe, The
Limits of John Rawls 's Pluralism, 4 POL. PHIL. & ECON. 221, 223-26 (2005).
Accordingly, one problem with applying Rawls's framework here is that affirmative action
attempts to remedy a clearly nonideal situation. HARRY BRIGHOUSE, JUSTICE 125 (2004). Had
the United States acted reasonably and ideally in the first place, there would be no need for
affirmative action. While Rawls himself never explicitly addressed affirmative action or other
"serious problems arising from existing [racial] discrimination," JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS
FAIRNESs: A RESTATEMENT § 18.6, at 66 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001), I nonetheless believe his
framework can provide new insights on old divisions precisely because it is idealized. This view
is shared by other scholars. See, e.g., Martin D. Carcieri, Rawls, Reparations, and Affirmative
1320 [Vol. 85:1315
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premised upon each opposing side's clear and public statement of who they believe is
the audience of the policy. Ideally, this public declaration of audience can provide
some common ground upon which opposing sides can build.
This Commentary defines audience as the answer to the question, "Whom precisely
are you trying to benefit or burden with this policy?" Whereas the target audience is
the primary population that the policy intends to influence directly, the incidental
audience is the population that may face secondary or collateral effects as a result.
Whereas benefits are supposed to be considered positive and desirable by the target
audience and are intended to reinforce some socially desirable conduct, burdens are the
opposite and may either be intended to discourage some socially undesirable conduct
by the target audience or simply be an unforeseen or unavoidable consequence
affecting the incidental audience. Affirmative action in higher-education admissions is
a stark example where the target audience's benefit, a coveted spot in a limited college
or graduate school entering class, comes with the incidental audience's burden, being
denied that same spot despite the fact that but for the affirmative action policy the
incidental audience might have been admitted.
Policy makers sometimes explicitly define the target audience of a particular policy,
but, because the target audience oftentimes remains unclear, opposing sides in a policy
debate can have a totally unrelated target or incidental audience or share some (or all)
of their target or incidental audience.
32
For example, the United States Supreme Court has failed to define explicitly the
target audience of school affirmative action admissions policies. Whereas minority
students sometimes appear to be the target audience of such policies,33 at other times
Action: Toward a Theory of Racial Justice 2 n. 10 (unpublished manuscript, presented at the
American Political Science Association annual meeting, Aug. 31, 2006), available at
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p150623_index.html (collecting authorities that argue
affirmative action can be derived from Rawls's theory).
Another problem with Rawls's framework is that it ignores the antagonistic dimension of
politics and the inescapable reality that divisive issues like affirmative action will ultimately be
decided by the most powerful in a democracy. Undoing past injustice unavoidably causes pain
and conflict. Moreover, sometimes conflict is constructive. See Orlando Patterson, Why Can't
We Find Consensus on Affirmative Action?, in THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CIVIL RIGHTS 77-
87 (Robert K. Fullinwider & Claudia Mills eds., 1986).
To this problem, Rawls would respond that such "might-makes-right" coerced stability
(commonly called a modus vivendi) not only comes at the potentially unjust expense of the less
powerful but also can be lost during divisive debates when a side concludes that maintaining
such stability is no longer in its self-interest. Umphres, supra note 24, at 4-7 (explaining
Rawls's concept of "stability for the right reasons"). While the procedural protections of a
traditional constitutional democracy do provide much stability, there remains the risk that a
tyrannical majority or secessionist minority will act solely out of self-interest. Id. Rawls aspires
for a more principled stability through overlapping consensus. See supra note 20.
31. See supra note 20.
32. This Commentary is limited to the situation where opposing sides share the same target
audience, like Bowen and Sander. Not only do opposing sides often have different target
audiences but also a particular side's intended target audience may be different than its publicly
declared target audience for political or pragmatic expediency.
33. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,551 U.S. 701,751
(2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The Constitution generally prohibits government race-based
decisionmaking, but this Court has authorized the use of race-based measures for remedial
purposes ... ").
13212010]
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all students appear to be the target audience. 34 While Bowen and Sander appear to
agree that minority students are the target audience of policies promoting and banning
affirmative action,35 Ward Connerly, in his public campaign to outlaw affirmative
action altogether, appears to believe that all students are his target audience.36 Bowen
and Sander might consider white students an incidental audience of such policies. Both
argue in their respective studies that the target audience, minority students, in reality
are not receiving the policy's intended legal benefit.
37
Bowen, for example, believes that one of the alleged benefits of banning affirmative
action policies for the target audience, minority students, is that minority students will
no longer feel the burden-internal and external stigma-that affirmative action
policies ostensibly cause.3 8 Her empirical study argues that, contrary to the colorblind
ideal, the banning of affirmative action policies might have the opposite effect.
3 9
In a different manner, Sander believes that one of the alleged benefits of affirmative
action policies for the target audience is that they provide the target audience "access
to higher education, entrde to the national elite, and a chance of correcting historic
underrepresentations in the leading professions." 40 His empirical study argues that,
contrary to conventional wisdom, affirmative action policies might have the opposite
effect. 4 1 Sander concludes that affirmative action "hurt the very people they were
intended to help."'42 Despite sharing the same audience, both Bowen and Sander
nevertheless present differing evidence about the people that form that audience.
This audience-focused approach thereby spotlights those who matter most, the
people the law affects. As Gary Melton observed, to fulfill law's "noble purposes," law
"must take people seriously" because "people ... value the law when it treats them
with respect-when it offers them a voice in a context in which they are treated with
politeness and dignity in a state of equality. ' 43 Before policy makers truly can evaluate
any policy, they must know what or who they are trying to measure-namely, the
audience. Without knowing the audience, policy makers cannot be serious about using
evidence to guide decision making and may be using such evidence after the decision
already has been made to provide political or popular cover for their inferred
justification.
34. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) ("[Ihe Law School's
admissions policy promotes 'cross-racial understanding,' helps to break down racial stereotypes,
and 'enables [students] to better understand persons of different races."').
35. See supra note 16.
36. See Ying Ma, Men of Stature: Obama Has No Monopoly on Hope, WASH. TIMES, Feb.
21, 2008, at A 15 ("Mr. Connerly declared that 'all Americans are entitled to equal treatment by
their government' and that 'racial, gender, and ethnic preferences are morally wrong."'); see
also Bowen, supra note 4, at 1212 n.87 (describing Connerly's activism).
37. See supra notes 6 and 11 and accompanying text.
38. Bowen, supra note 4, at 1198-99.
39. Id.; see also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
40. Sander, supra note 7, at 368.
41. Id.; see also supra note 11 and accompanying text.
42. Carol J. Williams, Does Affirmative Action Help or Hurt Lawyers? Professor Seeks
State Bar Exam Data to Study Racial Bias. Bar Says No, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2008, at 1.
43. Gary B. Melton, The Law Is a Good Thing (Psychology Is, Too): Human Rights in
Psychological Jurisprudence, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 381, 385 (1992).
[Vol. 85:13151322
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Inferred justification "operates as a backward chain of reasoning that justifies the
favored opinion by assuming the causal evidence that would support it."44 Ideologues
infer justification when they begin with their ideologically motivated belief and then
ask themselves "what must be true about the world" for that belief to hold. 45 Because
inferred justification inverts the proper steps of evidence-based policy making, 4 it
should be avoided.47
How is this different from conventional interest group analysis? 48 This audience-
focused approach differs from interest group analysis primarily in the preclusive nature
of the public declaration of the audience. Consistent with public reason,49 all sides in a
divisive policy debate must limit their public advocacy to their publicly declared target
and incidental audience. While a side can publicly amend their audience, they are
precluded from discussing anyone outside that audience. While a side can define their
audience as narrowly or expansively as they want, they must do so publicly and expect
opposing sides to hold them accountable for publicly demonstrating how their position
actually benefits or burdens their audience.
In effect, the public articulation of a policy's target audience provides the content of
the principle that should serve as the ideal of public reason.50 The target audience
needs to be expressed publicly for two reasons. First, because this model is limited to
deliberative democracies, 51 any proposed guiding principle must be expressed publicly
to encourage the open debate essential to deliberative democracy.52 Second, requiring a
44. Monica Prasad, Andrew J. Perrin, Kieran Bezila, Steve G. Hoffman, Kate Kindleberger,
Kim Manturuk & Ashleigh Smith Powers, "There Must Be a Reason ": Osama, Saddam, and
Inferred Justification, 79 Soc. INQUIRY 142, 155 (2009).
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., TERENCE ANDERSON, DAVID SCHUM & WILLIAM TWINING, ANALYSIS OF
EVIDENCE 47-48 (2d ed. 2005) (discussing "the dangers of a commitment to a single
hypothesis" and "the need to distinguish between generating a hypothesis and testing it against
the available data").
47. There is significant empirical research about the "legal preference for assumption over
fact" and the popular tendency "to select results that align with their prior beliefs rather than
adjusting their beliefs in response to contrary results." John F. Pfaff, A Plea for More
Aggregation: The Looming Threat to Empirical Legal Scholarship 3-4 (Fordham Univ. Sch. of
Law Working Paper Series, 2009) (citations omitted), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract= 14444 10.
48. See generally Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through
Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 228-29 (1986).
Interest group analysis treats policies like laws "as commodities that are purchased by particular
interest groups or coalitions of interest groups that outbid and outmaneuver competing interest
groups. The currency through which laws are bought and sold consists of political support,
promises of future favors, outright bribes, and whatever else politicians value." Id. (internal
citations omitted).
49. See supra note 24.
50. See Lawrence B. Solum, Public Legal Reason, 92 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1466 (2006)
(observing that "[c]ontemporary debates about public reason have tended to focus on the
content of the principle (or set of principles) that should serve as an ideal of public reason").
51. See supra note 21.
52. As Professor Solum has noted, "An ideal of public reason provides a systematic answer
to the following question: what limits does political morality impose on public political debate
and discussion by the citizens of a modem pluralist democracy?" Solum, supra note 50, at 1465.
2010] 1323
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target audience not only provides such a guiding principle but also facilitates empirical
studies about the relevant policy.
53
Thus, one of the primary reasons for the apparent paucity of evidence-based policy
making in pluralistic democracies may be that opposing sides in a divisive policy
debate initially fail to clarify who is the target or incidental audience. In essence, by
publicly defining their audience, opposing sides set forth their burden of proof in the
public debate.
Accordingly, opposing sides can meet their burden of proof only by publicly
providing factual evidence, what I call authentic outcomes or individual narratives,
about the policy's impact upon their audience. This public framework thereby
encourages gathering and analyzing evidence before making policy decisions.
B. Present Evidence About the Audience for Public Scrutiny
Second, each opposing side must factually and publicly demonstrate how its policy
position can actually benefit or burden its respective audience, the people it claims it
wants to benefit or burden. This paradigm shift changes the focus from the ideological
conflict between irreconcilable ideologies that fuels divisive policy debates to
constructive fact gathering. Because this model assumes that examining empirical
evidence before making policy is preferable, 54 it also assumes that each opposing side
should generate empirical evidence to support all of its arguments. 55 Whereas empirical
studies have often served as servants (or even hired guns) to legal ideology, 56 this
approach seeks to elevate empirical studies from ideological servant to referee of
ideological conflict. In effect, this approach seeks to make an end run around
ideological conflict by looking directly at facts about the policy's audience, much like
both Bowen and Sander have done.
When considering such facts-the "evidence" of this model-there are two
competing considerations. On the one hand, I hypothesize that one possible way
ideologically irreconcilable sides (mired in ideological conflict) can hope to build
consensus is through the power of studies like Bowen's and Sander's that, by relating
facts about a policy's audience, might create emphatic moments like I experienced.57
On the other hand, good policy making must be premised upon accurate facts and the
53. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 19, 46 & 53 and accompanying text.
55. This includes even hypothetical arguments. For example, policy analysts frequently use
simulations to test untried scenarios before spending enormous amounts of money on public-
works projects. See, e.g., EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY
ANALYsIs 89-90 (1978).
56. See David Nelken, Can Law Learn from Social Science?, 35 ISR. L. REv. 205, 209
(2001) ("In general terms, there is nothing surprising in saying that the relevance of social
science depends upon the extent to which it becomes subservient to the legal."); cf Samuel R.
Lucas & Marcel Paret, Law, Race, and Education in the United States, ANN. REv. L. & Soc.
Sci., 2005, at 207 ("Law is the midwife of race.... To justify their taking of the land and its
abundant resources, Europeans sought to set themselves over and above the native peoples....
The developing concept of race became key to this undertaking.") (collecting empirical studies
on race and education).
57. See supra notes 4-12 and accompanying text.
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potentially transformative, empathic power of such facts-particularly individual
narratives-also can make their accuracy and objectivity suspect. 58 As illustrated in
Figure B, I hope to balance these two considerations through a continuum of facts with
authentic outcomes about multiple people on one end and individual narratives on the
other. 59 Instead of substituting feeling for thinking, I want opposing sides to both feel
and think.
58. As James Boyd White has observed, "The narrative is the archetypal legal and rhetorical
form, as it is the archetypal form of human thought in ordinary life as well." JAMES BOYD
WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 175 (1985).
Critical legal scholars have long recognized the power of outsider narratives to change the law.
Reginald Oh & Thomas Ross, Judicial Opinions as Racial Narratives: The Story ofRichmond
v. Croson, in RACE LAW STORIES 381, 389 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon Wayne Carbado eds.,
2008) (collecting authorities); see also ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING
THE LAW 110 (2000) (concluding that "[l]aw lives on narrative"); ROBERT S. CHANG,
DISORIENTED: ASIAN AMERICANS, LAW, AND THE NATION-STATE (1999); James R. Elkins, On the
Emergence of Narrative Jurisprudence: The Humanistic Perspective Finds a New Path, 9
LEGAL STUD. F. 123, 145-46 (1985) (defining narrative jurisprudence); Valorie K. Vojdik, At
War: Narrative Tactics in the Citadel and VAHLitigation, 19 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 1,2 (1996)
(explaining how actual named plaintiffs make a difference in civil rights litigation). Such
transformative power lies at the heart of the Gandhian nonviolent philosophy of conflict,
satyagraha, where "dogma gives way to an open exploration of context. The objective is not to
assert propositions, but to create possibilities," JOAN V. BONDURANT, CONQUEST OF VIOLENCE:
THE GANDHIAN PHILOSOPHY OF CONFLICT, at vi-vii (Univ. of Cal. Press, rev. ed. 1965) (1958),
by "dramatiz[ing] the issues at stake ...to get through to the opponent's unprejudiced
judgment," id. at 11.
59. Figure B illustrates a continuum of evidence accuracy based upon the number ofpeople
in the audience represented by the evidence. On the extreme left, little to no information
representing nobody from the audience would be highly inaccurate. On the extreme right, total
information representing everyone from the audience probably would be highly accurate. There
is a line a, past which individual narratives are accurate enough to be used for rebuttal purposes.
There also is a line b, past which outcomes are accurate enough to be authentic outcomes.
In addition, among the many translation problems between social science and the law, two
are particularly relevant here. First, because law is primarily normative and prescriptive
(whereas social science is primarily descriptive), empirical research at most can inform divisive
policy debates but can never resolve them. See Edward L. Rubin, Law and the Methodology of
Law, 1997 WIs. L. REv. 521, 555. Second, because social science can model only individual
behavior, there is the "macro-micro problem," the "problem of developing explanatory accounts
that link individual and collective behavior." Id. at 556. Empirical studies "can model the
behavior of individuals or the behavior of institutions, but when an institution is primarily
composed of semi-independent, discretionary decision-makers," as with an education system or
society, "only an account which links both levels will provide a satisfactory image of the
totality." Id. at 557. As demonstrated by the "macro-micro problem," the participants in most
empirical studies will fall somewhere between these two ends of the continuum with more than
one participant but less than the entire audience.
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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE CONTINUUM
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Figure B: Empirical Evidence Continuum
1. Authentic Outcomes Obtained from Empirical Studies
What distinguishes an empirical study with authentic outcomes from another
empirical study with just plain facts? Essentially, there are three characteristics. First,
the facts must concern more than one individual to be reflective of the audience.
60
Second, the facts must be authentic-meaning they accurately reflect the audience and
are not caricatures or misrepresentations.6 1 Third, the facts must be outcomes. I define
outcomes as facts that are universally available from any audience regardless of
normative outlook.62 Facts that require a normative determination or might differ
60. Unless the audience happens to be one person. See, e.g., Robert C. Farrell, The Equal
Protection Class of One Claim: Olech, Engquist, and the Supreme Court's Misadventure, 61
S.C. L. REV. 107 (2009).
61. See, e.g., Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM 25,30
(Amy Gutman ed., 1994). As illustrated in Figure B, authentic outcomes are not necessarily
authoritative. Opposing sides often will have conflicting authentic outcomes about their
respective audiences. As John Pfaff has observed:
And so we find ourselves awash in seemingly contradictory claims. In
criminology, for example, studies claim that imposing tougher sentences reduces,
has no effect on, or possibly increases crime. And that is putting aside the death
penalty literature, where again the punishment either saves lives or has no effect-
or possibly even leads to a net loss of life. Felon disenfranchisement laws either
influence elections or do not. Then there is abortion, which is either a critical or
trivial factor in the crime drop of the 1990s. And the problem extends to
unemployment and crime, gun-control laws, the role of race in the criminal justice
system, and so on.
Pfaff, supra note 47, at 10-11 (collecting studies) (citations omitted). An authentic outcome
merely has satisfied some threshold requirement of accuracy so that it can be used as evidence in
the policy debate. See supra fig.B and infra note 62 and accompanying text.
62. Cf SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, Am. BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF
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between audiences by definition cannot be outcomes. Addressing methodological
conflict, this audience-and outcome-focus helps disciplines with different
methodologies compare and critique each other's empirical studies in an adversarial
manner. This public adversarial process should result in better empirical evidence.
For example, both Bowen's and Sander's studies contain outcomes. Although
Bowen's survey of psychic injury might appear subjective, the fact that minority
students felt psychic injury63 (as opposed to whether such feelings truly were justified,
which would not be an outcome) is an outcome that could apply equally to all students.
Likewise, Sander's quantitative academic and job-related data are outcomes that could
be obtained about all students.64 These outcomes are not necessarily mutually
exclusive. Because Bowen and Sander examined different aspects of the same
audience, both studies together might provide a more complete picture that combines
psychological self-image and pedagogical concerns with academic and job
performance.
Furthermore, this audience and outcome focus may remedy what Pfaff terms the
deductive "epistemological failure" of most empirical social science studies.65 Pfaff
argues that the empirical social sciences are built around Karl Popper's idea of
falsification, that "the task of empiricists is to propose ever-more daring hypotheses,
test them, and seek to falsify them."66 This deductive attempt "to refute a null
hypothesis" '67 is unhelpful for policy making, argues Pfaff, because "the most that can
ever be said about a hypothesis is that it has not yet been refuted. Failure to refute
provides no evidence of confirmation. . . . [T]hat an observation contradicts a
hypothesis does not establish why, or perhaps even whether, the hypothesis is in fact
incorrect." 68 In contrast, both Bowen and Sander sought to disprove a null hypothesis
through inductive empirical counterexamples. 69 By ignoring the methodological
conflict between different empirical studies, 70 allowing for the comparison and
synthesis of those studies, and focusing on the subject of those studies-the audience--
this approach may better provide the affirmative, inductive evidence required for good
policy making.
THE OUTCOME MEASURES CoMMrrEE 3 (2008) (contrasting "outcome measures" and "input
measures"), available at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/committees/subcomm/Outcome
MeasuresFinalReport.pdf.
63. See Bowen, supra note 4, at 1223-25.
64. See Sander, supra note 7, at 478-81.
65. Pfaff, supra note 47, at 6.
66. Id. at 12.
67. Id. at 6.
68. Id. at 12-13 (emphasis in original).
69. See supra notes 6, 11 & 13 and accompanying text. Whereas Bowen sought to
contradict the colorblind ideal's null hypothesis that banning affirmative action would improve
the target audience's self-esteem, see notes 38-39 and accompanying text, Sander sought to
contradict what he considered conventional wisdom's null hypothesis that affirmative action
would result in the target audience possessing improved performance and job outcomes, see
notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
70. Although the adversarial nature of this model will allow opposing sides to criticize the
case-by-case methodology of their respective studies, this approach allows the model to remain
agnostic to the overall question of which methodological approach is best.
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2. Individual Narratives Only in Rebuttal to Such Authentic Outcomes
The reason why individual narratives are restricted to rebuttal is to avoid
essentialism. Essentialism is where one voice, the "second voice," claims "to speak for
all.",7 1 While an individual narrative might not be authentic or accurately represent the
audience, an individual narrative can provide a counterexample to rebut authentic
outcomes. Moreover, because empirical studies are often very expensive,72 individual
narratives allow even the most impoverished party a way to participate in the policy
debate.
In recent history, I believe that anti-affirmative action activists like the Center for
Individual Rights 73 have appropriated the transformative power of individual narratives
from affirmative action supporters with their careful selection of sympathetic, diverse,
white plaintiffs like Cheryl Hopwood and Barbara Grutter.74 In his controversial
opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,75
Chief Justice Roberts appeared to acknowledge implicitly the power of such individual
stories when, out of the thousands of potential student stories, he decided to tell Andy
Meeks's sympathetic story in his statement of facts. 76 Because such individual
71. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV.
581,588 (1990). Essentialism assumes that one or a few members of a group represent the entire
group. For example,
[g]ender essentialism refers to the fixing of certain attributes to women. These
attributes may be natural, biological, or psychological, or may refer to activities
and procedures that are not necessarily dictated by biology. These essential
attributes are considered to be shared by all women and hence also universal.
"Essentialism thus refers to the existence of fixed characteristics, given attributes,
and ahistorical functions that limit the possibilities of change and thus social
reorganization."
Ratna Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the "Native" Subject in
International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics, 15 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 7 (2002)
(citation omitted); see also Ian Ayres, Is Discrimination Elusive?, 55 STAN. L. REv. 2419,2428
(2003) (book review) (identifying the importance of empirical evidence that cannot be as easily
dismissed by the "general public and lawmakers" as individual narrative).
72. See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, Reflections on the Twin Dreams ofSimplified Procedure
and Useful Empiricism, 35 W. ST. U. L. REv. 173, 189 (2007). Professor Pfaff, however,
believes that relatively inexpensive statistical computer software programs have resulted in more
low-quality empirical work. Pfaff, A Plea for More Aggregation, supra note 47, at 3-4.
73. Adrien Katherine Wing, Race-Based Affirmative Action in American Legal Education,
51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 443, 446 (2001) (identifying the Center for Individual Rights as an anti-
affirmative action group).
74. Wendy Parker, The Story of Grutter v. Bollinger: Affirmative Action Wins, in
EDUCATION LAW STORIEs 83, 87-88 (Michael A. Olivas & Ronna Greff-Schneider eds., 2008).
75. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
76. Id. at 713-14 ("Andy suffered from attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder and
dyslexia,. . . and his mother and middle school teachers thought that the... program held the
most promise for his continued success. Andy was accepted into this selective program but,
because of the racial tiebreaker, was denied assignment."). Incidentally, the Parents Involved
decision demonstrates that a majority of the Supreme Court may agree that "'[a]t the heart of the
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must
treat citizens as individuals."' Id. at 730 (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,911 (1995)).
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narratives can rebut authentic outcomes powerfully, stories like Andrew's are entitled
to be heard not just by the side supposedly representing his interests but also by the
opposing side.
C. Examine the Opposing Sides Evidence Civilly and Sincerely
Third, in the spirit of civility, and public reason, each side should examine civilly
and sincerely the opposing side's publicly available authentic outcomes or rebutting
individual narratives about the benefits and burdens of the current policy upon the
other side's audience. In so doing, they would follow the advice of perhaps the greatest
lawyer in American literature, Atticus Finch: "You never really understand a person
until you consider things from his point of view... until you climb into his skin and
walk around in it."' 79 With divisive debates, perhaps the only way to attain an
overlapping consensus 80 that transcends intractable ideology or cynical power struggles
is to allow your adversary a sincere and respectful opportunity to be heard. 1
D. Consider How the Current Policy Actually Affects Every Side s Audience
Fourth, each side should consider whether the current policy actually affects every
side's audience in the manner envisioned by every side. This step helps insure there is
an efficient and appropriate "fit" between lofty legal principles and the implementing
ground-level procedures. Educational policies like affirmative action are often "not
self-executing" and "frequently require public managers to design and implement
ordered reforms." 82 For example, even the most ardent affirmative action supporter
would probably agree with affirmative action adversaries that implementing procedures
which rely solely upon unsophisticated racial quotas are no longer preferable.83 This
instrumental perspective of law recognizes that in the final analysis real law is how
77. See supra note 23.
78. See supra note 24.
79. HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 33 (40th Anniversary ed. 1999).
80. See supra note 20.
81. Kim Forde-Mazrui has advocated for an inclusive and candid study of race and the law
with "a committed willingness to invite a broad range of perspectives and experiences into the
discussion, including from race exceptionalists or people reluctant to risk expressing politically
incorrect views." He proposes discussions that "take adverse views seriously and acknowledge
legitimate points by intellectual or political adversaries, even when those points cut against
one's own position." Kim Forde-Mazrui, Learning Law Through the Lens of Race, 21 J.L. &
POL. 1, 26-27 (2005).
Such civility and respect for opposing viewpoints is essential for improving evidence-based
policy making in a pluralistic democracy. As Chief Justice Warren Burger noted, "There is
nothing incompatible between zealous and courageous advocancy [sic] and conformity to
standards of ethics and professional behavior." Warren E. Burger, The Role of the Law School
in the Teaching ofLegal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 377, 381
(1980).
82. Terry W. Hartle, The Law, the Courts, Education and Public Administration, 41 PUB.
ADMIN. REv. 595, 595 (1981).
83. Of course, such racial quotas are also unconstitutional. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 334 (2003).
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everyday people act.84 Consequently, for a policy to be truly meaningful and people-
focused, it must be created and implemented in such a way that the target audience
understands the policy.
E. Strive for the Target Audience to Understand the Policy
Finally, policy makers should adjust the current policy until it can be ascertained
through authentic outcomes or rebutting individual narratives that the policy benefits or
burdens the target audience in such a way that the target audience both knows and
understands the benefits or burdens. This last requirement is based upon my own
intuitive opposition to legal paternalism. If the target audience indeed is appropriate,
then for the policy to have its intended effect a priori, the target audience must know
and understand the intended effect. While such "recognition of cultural particularity" is
"compatible with a form of universalism that counts the culture and cultural context" as
a basic interest, this consideration is more difficult when the content of that cultural
particularity is biased or discriminatory.8 5 This requirement should result in greater
popular buy-in and, consequently, more effective results. Ultimately, the best rationale
for evidence-based policy making is the belief that it will result in better, more
effective governance.
CONCLUSION
In future research, I hope to develop this working model further. In addition to the
difficult question of biased or discriminatory audiences above, I recognize that I still
need to address some fundamental questions, competing concerns, and underlying
access to information.
First, there is the broader question whether this approach is too idealistic. Because,
in a pluralistic democracy, divisive policy debates ultimately will be determined by the
political process, the most this working model can ask for is that opposing sides civilly
and sincerely examine the publicly available evidence about their respective audiences.
Why would the more privileged and powerful agree to encourage greater evidence-
based policy making? How would the public hold a bad-faith party accountable for
lack of public transparency in its audience or evidence?
While these questions are well-taken, I submit that the current approach is
worthwhile precisely because it is idealistic. In a pluralistic democracy, we always will
84. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw 3 (1990).
85. Amy Gutman, Introduction, in MULTICuLTURAuSM,supra note 72, at 3,5. For example,
a hypothetical affirmative action policy that provided a specific underrepresented Jawa-
American target audience greater benefits than a specific underrepresented Klingon-American
incidental audience might publicly justify itself by reinforcing a cultural stereotype shared
among both audiences that Jawa-Americans are not as hard working as Klingon-Americans.
While both audiences may know and understand the benefits and burdens of the policy, the
public explanation nevertheless reinforces inaccurate racial stereotypes.
Rawls recognized there are some extremist worldviews incompatible with a constitutional
democracy. See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 39. Determining how to distinguish between reasonable
and unreasonable worldviews is an important question, see, e.g., Mouffe, supra note 30, at 223-
26, but I leave it for another time.
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have cynical power struggles over vote-counting in elections, on the courts, or in the
legislature. Not only should an audience-focused approach result in more effective
policies but also such principles still can guide and inform debate even if they are far
from reality. For example, the evidence-based, policy making ideal can be likened to
the ideal of honest, fair, and diligent governance. Although most Americans might
believe that "the honesty and ethical standards of 'members of Congress' are low or
very low,"86 the governance ideal can-and, I would argue, should-still guide and
inform debate.
Second, this Commentary addressed only the Bowen and Sander situation where
both sides agreed upon the target audience. Although Bowen and Sander agreed upon
the same target audience and presented authentic outcomes obtained from their
empirical studies about the benefits and burdens of affirmative action upon this
audience,8 7 they fundamentally disagree over whether or not affirmative action is
helping or hurting their shared audience.88 I need to address how the working model
would function when there is little or no overlap among audiences. How does a
pluralistic democracy balance a target audience's benefit with an incidental audience's
burden, particularly in the zero-sum context of higher education admissions? The
working model examines each policy in isolation. What about the interaction of
multiple audiences for multiple policies?
8 9
Finally, I believe Sander has raised a data access question worthy of inquiry. In
2006 testimony in front of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Sander
accused law schools of being "captive to a dominant ideology that has become
deliberately entrenched," of"go[ing] to great lengths to disguise" their true affirmative
action policies, and of refusing to disclose "accurate information about law school
policies and the likely impact of these policies" upon minority students.90 If Sander is
86. Lydia Saad, Honesty and Ethics Poll Finds Congress' image Tarnished, GALLuP POLL,
Dec. 9, 2009, available at http://www.gallup.com/pollU124625/honesty-ethics-poll-finds-
congress-image-tamished.aspx.
87. See supra notes 15, 37-42 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
89. Perhaps the interaction of multiple audiences for multiple policies can provide the
inductive empirical knowledge and systematic reviews that Pfaff argues are most helpful for
what he calls "[e]vidence based policy." Pfaff, supra note 47, at 25-26. Pfaff's crossword
puzzle analogy for inductive empirical knowledge also might apply to the aggregation of policy
audiences:
One answer, sitting alone in the grid, is tentative at best. But as other words
successfully cut across it, and as still-other words successfully intersect these
crossing words, our confidence in both the original answer and the overall solution
grows. So too with empirical work. One study provides little insight on its own,
but as we derive other results that align with the first study our confidence in both
that study and those that warrant it (and those that in turn warrant the warranting
studies) grows, and thus our confidence in our overall understanding of a
particular issue. And conversely with disagreement: like answers in the puzzle that
do not line up, contradictions provide warning that some part of the overall story
we are telling may not be accurate.
Id. at 15 (citing SusAN HAACK, DEFENDING ScIENcE-WrrTN REAsoN: BETwEEN SCIEmNSM AND
CYNICISM (2007)).
90. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN AMERICAN LAW SCHOoLS 34
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correct that schools are capable of making relevant evidence public but decline to do
so, perhaps out of a fear of litigation or alienating public opinion, then this policy-
making decision merits further investigation. Consistent with public reason and
transparency, should this information be made public or are there intervening concerns
that necessitate an exception?9' Regardless of your opinion of Sander's efforts, it is
difficult to quibble with the general plea for mutual respect issued by one of Sander's
supporters, "'We see our job as getting the data and giving it to both sides' of the
debate over the value and efficacy of affirmative action, 'Politics should not block
otherwise valid, even if controversial, academic research."' 92
Public policy based upon mutual respect and focused upon people may provide the
only way to build consensus in divisive debates over difficult issues like affirmative
action. Deirdre Bowen's recent study provides necessary and provocative evidence to
move this debate forward.
(2007). Sander specifically recommended that Congress pass the Racial and Ethnic Preference
Disclosure Act sponsored by Representative Steve King (R-Iowa), id. at 8-9, a bill that Sander
believes would require higher education institutions to "document and explain their procedures
in areas in which much independent evidence suggests an inappropriate consideration of racial
factors." Id. at 34; see also Sander, supra note 7, at 385 (citations omitted). Along with the
California First Amendment Coalition, Sander has sued the State Bar of California in an effort
to obtain historical bar exam data. Mike McKee, Affirmative Action Study Hits New Snag,
RECORDER (San Francisco), Mar. 18, 2010, at 1 (describing pending Sander v. State Bar of
California lawsuit).
91. The Los Angeles Times has observed, "Regardless of what we think of Sander's
hypothesis, he should be given the data he seeks. Defenders of affirmative action should not fear
a serious examination of how well it's working." Editorial, Don't Bar Data: A Professor
Studying Affirmative Action Should Have Access to Law School Performance Statistics, L.A.
TIMEs, Sept. 17, 2008, at 22. Others fear that the data might lead to misleading conclusions. For
example, the executive director of the Minority Corporate Counsel Association responded,
"'Studying statistics tells you what, but not how or why.' If the purpose of Sander's research 'is
to take people and categorize them and point fingers and say affirmative action works for this
one but not that one, I don't see any good purpose served."' Williams, supra note 42.
92. Williams, supra note 42.
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